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a b s t r a c t 
Cooperative interactions constitute the backbone of many biological and social systems. Since coopera- 
tion is prone to exploitation, these systems must incorporate mechanisms that prevent the spreading of 
defective behaviors. One such mechanism is modularity, i.e., the tendency of a social network to be orga- 
nized in modules, where individuals within a module tend to interact strongly among themselves while 
avoiding interacting with individuals from other modules. This structure allows cooperation to prevail 
by having modules of cooperative individuals with a limited exposure to defectors. To address the rate 
and shape of the effect of modularity on the resilience of cooperation, here we study a variant of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma on modular networks. Our simulations reveal a sharp transition between a resilient 
and a vulnerable regime as modularity exceeds a critical threshold. By using a simpliﬁed mathematical 
model, we show that the observed threshold is equivalent to the epidemic threshold found in a certain 
class of SIR models. This allows us to derive an explicit condition under which a cooperative society is 
expected to be resilient to invasive defectors. 
© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
The functioning of many biological and social systems relies on 
cooperative interactions between individuals. Striking examples of 
such systems include multicellular organisms, eusocial insects, or 
human societies. Since cooperation is prone to exploitation by de- 
fectors, it is a major scientiﬁc challenge to explain how such sys- 
tems can evolve and prevail. 
Among other mechanisms, a non-random social structure has 
been found to foster the evolutionary success of cooperative strate- 
gies ( Nowak, 2006; Nowak and May, 1992 ). This ﬁnding arose 
largely from the study of models that extend classical game the- 
ory by explicitly incorporating a network that determines the con- 
tacts individuals can make ( Lieberman et al., 2005; Nowak, 2006 ). 
In particular, the individuals occupy the nodes of the network and 
act either as cooperators or defectors. They then engage with their 
neighbors in games such as the Prisoners Dilemma, that capture 
the vulnerability of cooperators to exploitation by defectors. Evo- 
lution is incorporated by making the probability of reproduction 
dependent on the payoff individuals acquire from repeated rounds 
of the game. Studies based on such models further indicate that 
∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: daniel.wechsler@ieu.uzh.ch (D. Wechsler). 
the precise structure of the contact network also matters. In par- 
ticular, it was found that heterogeneous networks, which resemble 
those observed in real systems, are more favorable for cooperation 
than, for instance, regular networks ( Santos et al., 2006 ). 
Many real networks are highly modular. Modularity is the ten- 
dency of nodes to form distinct groups (modules) with connections 
running more likely between nodes within the same group than 
between nodes in different groups. Examples of real networks with 
a modular structure include metabolic networks ( Ravasz, 2002 ), 
ecological communities ( Grilli et al., 2016 ) or social networks 
( Girvan and Newman, 2002 ). It is widely believed, that a modular 
organization can generally increase the global resilience of a sys- 
tem to local perturbations ( May, 1972 ). The intuitive argument is 
that a sparse inter module connectivity would buffer the spread of 
a perturbation across module boundaries ( May, 1972; Stouffer and 
Bascompte, 2011 ). There are indeed theoretical predictions as well 
as a recent experimental result ( Gilarranz et al., 2017 ) that suggest 
that a modular structure can indeed buffer the spreading of local 
perturbations. 
Here, we investigate the potential of such a buffering effect in 
the context of the evolution of cooperation. In particular, we are 
interested in how modularity affects the resilience of a cooperative 
society against a collapse induced by a single invasive defector. In 
order to shed light on this question we combine simulations and 
analytical work using the model proposed in Santos et al. (2006) . 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.10.018 
0022-5193/© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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2. Methods 
2.1. Game dynamics 
We use the model proposed in Santos et al. (2006) to inves- 
tigate how the resilience of a cooperative society against the in- 
vasion of a defective individual depends on the modularity of the 
underlying contact network. This contact network is assumed to be 
static and represents the social structure of the society. In particu- 
lar, each individual occupies a node on the network and interacts 
only with its direct neighbors. The evolutionary process advances 
in discrete time steps (i.e., iterations), with a single time step in- 
volving two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, the ﬁtness of each individual 
is evaluated. An individual’s ﬁtness is taken to be the sum of the 
payoff it acquires from a single round of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(PD) game against each of its direct neighbors. In the PD, each in- 
dividual acts according to its innate strategy as either a cooperator 
( C ) or defector ( D ). The game parametrization we use depends on a 
single parameter b ∈ [1, 2], that determines the payoff advantage of 
a defector when playing against a cooperator (cheating advantage). 
The payoff matrix is shown in the table below with the values in- 
dicating the payoff of the row player given its own strategy and 
that of its opponent (columns): 
In the second phase, each individual competes with a randomly 
chosen neighbor for the node it is currently occupying. If the cho- 
sen neighbor accumulated a higher payoff, an offspring of it re- 
places the focal individual with a probability proportional to the 
payoff difference between the competing individuals. This proba- 
bility is given by the following equation: 
q = max 
[ 
z j − z i 
b k max 
, 0 
] 
, (1) 
where z i indicates the payoff sum of the focal individual and z j 
represents the payoff sum of the randomly chosen neighbor. The 
factor k max is the largest degree of the two nodes and assures 
that q is in the unit interval. All network nodes are updated syn- 
chronously (i.e., in a single time step all individuals are updated) 
and a simulation ends after a predeﬁned number of time steps T 
(see supplementary material for a pseudo code of the game dy- 
namics). 
2.2. Modular network generation 
We consider networks with m statistically identical modules. 
That is, we assume that each module has the same number of 
nodes n , the same number of internal connections L in (i.e. con- 
nections within modules), and the same number of outgoing con- 
nections L out (i.e. connections between modules). Further, we re- 
quire that the number of connections between each pair of mod- 
ules is the same and therefore given by L out / (m − 1) . To quantify 
the modularity of such a network we use the measure proposed by 
Newman and Girvan (2004) which, for the subset of network struc- 
tures considered here, can be written as Trajanovski et al. (2013) : 
Q = 1 − 1 
m 
− L out 
2 L in + L out 
(2) 
This measure captures the tendency of nodes to be preferably 
connected to nodes within the same module. It can take values 
in the interval [ − 1 2 , 1 − 1 m ] , with the maximal value taken for a 
network with m isolated modules. 
Given a number of modules m , nodes per module n , and total 
number of links L , a network of a desired modularity can be con- 
structed by calculating the right proportion of within module L in 
and between module L out links using equation (2) and the fact that 
L = mL in + 1 2 mL out . We followed the following two step procedure 
in order to assemble the network ( Decelle et al., 2011; Karrer and 
Newman, 2011 ) (see supplementary material for a pseudo-code): 
(i) For each of the m modules, we created the internal connec- 
tions by placing a link between L in randomly chosen node pairs. 
We required that each of the n nodes has at least one internal 
connection and that there can not be more than one connection 
between any node pair. Hence, each module by itself is an Erdös- 
Rényi random graph with L in edges ( Erdös and Rényi, 1960 ). 
(ii) Between each pair of modules we establish L out / (m − 1) 
links with the end points chosen at random. Also, in this step we 
do not allow for multiple edges between the same two nodes. 
By keeping L constant and varying only the ratio of L in to L out , 
this procedure allows us to generate networks with different val- 
ues of modularity but constant average node degree and statis- 
tically invariant degree distributions. There are however certain 
constraints on the parameter combinations for which a network 
can be realized. Most important, for a network with modules of 
size n , the maximum number of internal links L in is n (n − 1) / 2 , 
which is the case when each node pair in a module is connected, 
i.e., modules are cliques. Although the minimum number of inter- 
nal links required for n nodes to form a connected component is 
n − 1 , we considered only networks with L in > 1 2 log (n − 1) , which 
designates the boundary above which random networks form al- 
most surely a single connected component ( Erdös and Rényi, 1960 ). 
Further, we only considered networks for which the partitioning 
of nodes into modules, that we impose, is the one that maxi- 
mizes Q . We controlled for that by comparing the modularity value 
of our partitioning with the modularity value of the best parti- 
tioning found by commonly used modularity detection algorithms 
( Newman, 2006; Reichardt and Bornholdt, 2006 ). 
2.3. Simulations 
We started each simulation from a single defector in a network 
of otherwise only cooperators. The model was then iterated for 
a predeﬁned number of time steps T . The duration T was chosen 
such that it was long enough for the simulations to reach an equi- 
librium. Since this value depends on system size we indicate it for 
each computational experiment separately in the main text. As will 
be explained in the results section, defectors have a competitive 
advantage within modules and therefore, upon invasion of a mod- 
ule, they replace the majority of the resident cooperators. Thus, at 
equilibrium we ﬁnd modules to be either occupied by only coop- 
erators (those that resisted invasion) or by a majority of defectors. 
As our resilience measure we took the fraction of modules that re- 
sisted defector invasion. For a single simulation we computed this 
quantity from the state at time step T. To account for the stochas- 
ticity of the model, we calculated the ﬁnal data for a particular 
parameter combination as an average from a large number of sim- 
ulations using a newly generated (i.e., randomized) network each 
time. The actual number of simulations used per parameter combi- 
nation depends on the computational experiment and is indicated 
at the respective position in the main text. 
3. Results 
Fig. 1 shows the fraction of modules able to resist defector inva- 
sion as a function of modularity for different values of the cheating 
advantage b . 
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Fig. 1. Fraction of modules able to resist defector invasion, as a function of mod- 
ularity Q , for different values of the cheating advantage b , and average degree 
k¯ = 100 (number of modules m = 50 , and nodes per module n = 150 ). The value 
of each data point is the average from 60 0 simulations ( T = 120 0 ). 
Fig. 2. Typical equilibrium? conﬁguration of cooperators (blue) and defectors (yel- 
low) on the N = 250 nodes of a highly modular network with m = 5 modules. The 
numbers indicate the average payoff of defectors ( ¯z d ) and cooperators ( ¯z c ) within 
each module and the asterisk ( ∗) indicates the module where the ﬁrst defector orig- 
inated. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader 
is referred to the web version of this article.) 
The effect of modularity on the fraction of resistant modules is 
highly non-linear. In particular, we observe a sharp transition from 
a vulnerable to a resilient regime as modularity is increased. In the 
vulnerable regime, all modules fall victim to defectors, while in the 
resilient regime, defectors are constrained to the module where 
they initially appear. 
Fig. 2 shows a typical equilibrium state along the transition, 
when neither cooperators nor defectors dominate. For illustration 
purposes, we used a network with only ﬁve modules and grouped 
the 250 nodes accordingly. In this case, defectors (yellow nodes) 
originate from the right-most module (indicated by the asterisk) 
and managed to expand into two additional modules. We will re- 
fer to modules that fall victim to defectors as defector modules and 
those that are only occupied by cooperators (blue nodes) as coop- 
erator modules . 
The numbers next to each module indicate the average payoff
of defectors ( ¯z d ) and cooperators ( ¯z c ) within each module. Since 
Fig. 3. Illustration of a two module network with L in the number of edges within 
each module and L out the number of edges between modules. Both modules are 
internally fully connected and hence the number of nodes per module n constraints 
the number of internal edges to L in = (n 2 − n ) / 2 . Modularity Q 2 of this network 
depends only on L out and has its maximum at 
1 
2 
. 
defectors proﬁt only from a few interactions with cooperators, 
their average payoff is much lower than the one of cooperators 
on cooperator modules. This payoff difference prevents defectors 
from expanding further into the two remaining cooperator mod- 
ules. Likewise, cooperators can not take over defector modules. The 
insular cooperators, originating from adjacent cooperator modules, 
can not expand further because their offspring is exploited by the 
defector dominated neighborhood. 
Within a module, defectors have a competitive advantage over 
cooperators. Thus, if defectors can take over a node in a coop- 
erator module, the majority of the resident cooperators will be 
replaced. This local advantage of defectors, however, counteracts 
their prospect of expanding further into adjacent modules, because 
the co-resident cooperators are their primary payoff source. 
As it will be shown, this density dependent effect determines 
the probability with which defectors can overcome module bound- 
aries and consequently the expected fraction of modules they can 
invade. In what follows, we derive a mathematical expression for 
this invasion probability for the simpliﬁed two module system de- 
picted in Fig. 3 . We then show that knowing the invasion proba- 
bility for a two module system is enough to predict the fraction 
of modules invaded in a multi-module network. In a last step, we 
show that even though our expression for the invasion probability 
is derived for the special case in which modules are cliques, pre- 
dictions based on it also hold if this constraint is relaxed. 
3.1. Invasion probability for a two module system 
For the two module system in Fig. 3 , we deﬁne the invasion 
probability p 2 as the expected probability with which defectors 
(yellow), when expanding from a single randomly chosen node in 
module B , manage to invade the cooperator module A (take over 
a node in A ). We will derive an expression for p 2 as a function of 
modularity Q , the cheating advantage b and the number of nodes 
per module n under the simplifying assumption that both modules 
are cliques, i.e., within a module each node is connected to each 
other node. With this constraint the modularity of the network is 
only a function of L out (since m = 2 and L in = (n 2 − n ) / 2 ). We will 
use the symbol Q 2 to refer to the modularity of this type of two 
module network. 
Consider the strategy update of a single node in module A . For 
the present cooperator to be replaced by a defector from module 
B three conditions need to be met: 
First, the cooperator must compete against an individual on 
a node in module B . On average this happens with probability 
k out / (k in + k out ) , where k in is the expected number of connections 
the cooperator node has to other nodes in module A and k out 
is the expected number of connections to nodes from module B . 
Since k out = L out /n and k in = 2 L in /n, the probability for a cooper- 
ator to compete against a node from module B is given by α = 
L out / (2 L in + L out ) , which corresponds to the last term in equation 
(2) . Independent of m , this term is the probability of an individual 
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to engage in an inter module interaction. We can also write this 
probability in terms of the modularity of the two module network 
as 1 2 − Q 2 . 
Second, the selected node from module B must be occupied by 
a defector. If we assume that nodes in module B that have a con- 
nection to module A are equally likely to be occupied by defectors 
and cooperators, then this probability is equal to the fraction of 
defectors d in module B . 
Third, if indeed a defector occupies the chosen node, that de- 
fector must “beat” the resident cooperator. The expected probabil- 
ity of this to happen can be computed by applying the expected 
payoff of a cooperator in module A ( z c ) and the expected defec- 
tor payoff ( z d ) to formula (1) . The expected payoff of a coopera- 
tor in module A is z c = k in + (1 − d) k out and that of a defector is 
z d = bk in (1 − d) + bk out . Now we make the simplifying assumption 
that individuals receive only a payoff from interactions with nodes 
in the same module. Hence, the last terms in the sums in the for- 
mulas for z c and z d are not taken into account. Given these three 
considerations, the probability r 2 for a cooperator in module A to 
be replaced by a defector during a single update, given the fraction 
of defectors d in module A , the degree of modularity Q 2 , and the 
cheating advantage b , can be written as: 
r 2 (d) = d ( 1 
2 
− Q 2 ) max 
[ 
1 − 1 
b 
− d, 0 
] 
. (3) 
We wrote r 2 as a function of d because in contrast to Q 2 and 
b, d is a dynamic quantity (see supplementary material for more 
details on the derivation of Eq. 3 ). 
Given a time series d 0 , d 1 , . . . d T of defector frequencies in mod- 
ule B , we can calculate the probability with which defectors man- 
age to invade module A up to time step T as 
P n (T ) = 1 −
T ∏ 
t=0 
[
1 − r 2 (d t ) 
]
n , (4) 
where n is the number of nodes per module. This accounts for the 
fact that in a single iteration each node in the cooperator module 
could potentially be taken over by a defector. 
The change in the frequency of defectors in module B in a sin- 
gle iteration, given the current frequency d , can be approximated 
as: 
δ(d) = d (1 − d) 2 (1 − 1 
b 
) , (5) 
This function is approximate in the sense that, like equation (3) , 
it ignores the payoff from interactions with module A and assumes 
n >> 1. It is derived in the supplementary material along the lines 
of equation (3) as the product of i) the probability of a coopera- 
tor in module B to interact with a defector (in module B ), ii) the 
probability of the defector replacing the cooperator, and iii) the 
current cooperator frequency. For d ∈ (0, 1) and b ∈ (1, 2], δ( d ) is 
always positive, reﬂecting the fact that in a homogeneous society 
(fully connected module), defectors always out compete coopera- 
tors. Thus, a time series obtained by iterating d t = d t + δ(d t ) , from 
an initial frequency d 0 , follows a logistic growth curve with defec- 
tors always reaching ﬁxation (within module B ). 
The black line in Fig. 4 shows such a growth curve when start- 
ing the iteration from a single defector d 0 = 1 /n . The blue curve 
is the normalized payoff difference between defectors in module B 
and cooperators in module A . It corresponds to the ﬁrst argument 
of the max function in equation (3) and thus determines the prob- 
ability with which a cooperator in module A is replaced by a de- 
fector upon an interaction (negative parts not shown). As the num- 
ber of defectors increases, this quantity decreases until it reaches 
zero at d ∗ = 1 − 1 
b 
. Once this threshold density is crossed, defectors 
are not anymore able to invade module A. This is indicated by the 
red curve, the probability with which defectors can invade mod- 
ule A in a given time step. It corresponds essentially to r 2 ( d ) but 
Fig. 4. Time evolution of the frequency of defectors within a module (black), prob- 
ability of a defector in module B replacing a cooperator in module A upon an inter- 
action (blue), per iteration invasion probability (red) and its temporal accumulation 
(yellow). The parameters used are n = 400 , b = 1 . 5 and Q = 0 . 476 . (For interpreta- 
tion of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the 
web version of this article.) 
Fig. 5. Invasion probability p 2 as a function of the modularity Q 2 of a two module 
system ( m = 2 ) with n = 250 nodes per module, computed using equation (6) for 
different cheating advantages b (lines). The dots represent results from simulations 
with the corresponding parameter values. For each Q 2 , b combination we performed 
5500 simulations for T = 1400 time steps and calculated the invasion probability as 
the fraction of simulations in which defectors could invade module A. 
takes into account that there are n nodes that can potentially be 
taken over during a single iteration. The yellow curve corresponds 
to P n ( t ), the probability that defectors manage to invade module A 
up to time t . The asymptotic value of this curve, which is reached 
when d(t) = d ∗, is the invasion probability p 2 . 
As explained in the supplementary material, by considering the 
continuous time limit case, p 2 can be expressed in terms of the 
following equation: 
p 2 = 1 − e 
∫ d ∗
1 
n 
n 
δ(d) 
log 
[
1 −r 2 (d ) 
]
d d 
(6) 
The lines in Fig. 5 show p 2 as a function of Q 2 for different 
values of the cheating advantage (using numerical integration of 
equation (6) ). The dots are simulation results computed as the 
fraction of 5500 simulations per data point in which defectors 
managed to invade module A when starting from a single defec- 
tor in module B . Apparently, there is a good agreement between 
the predictions and the simulations. The tendency of a slight un- 
derestimation of the true invasion probability is most likely due 
to neglecting payoff from inter module interactions in equations 
(3) and (5) . 
3.2. Extension to multi-module system 
After having derived an expression for the invasion probability 
for a two module system, we will now use it to predict the fraction 
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Fig. 6. Fraction of modules resisting defector invasion calculated as the asymptotic 
value of C s divided by m (lines) and the same quantity computed as the average 
from 10 0 0 simulations per data point and T = 180 0 . 
of modules able to resist defector invasion in a multi-module net- 
work. For that, we deﬁne a compartment model that describes the 
system at the level of module states rather than node states. This 
model can be expressed in terms of the following three coupled 
difference equations: 
U s +1 = C s (1 − (1 − p m ) U s ) 
C s +1 = C s −C s (1 − (1 − p m ) U s ) (7) 
D s +1 = D s + U s 
The state variables C, D and U represent the number of coop- 
erator, defector and transient modules in the network at time s . 
Transient modules are modules which are invaded by defectors, 
but with defector frequency not yet beyond the threshold value d ∗
(see Fig. 4 ). The model assumes that a unit of time s corresponds 
to the duration of the transient phase and hence, every transient 
module in time step s becomes a defector module at s + 1 (third 
equation). Further, every transient module at time s can turn ev- 
ery cooperator module with probability p m in a transient module 
at time s + 1 (ﬁrst and second equation). This reﬂects defectors in- 
vading cooperator modules from transient modules. The parameter 
p m is the invasion probability speciﬁc for a network with m mod- 
ules. For a pair of modules, p m is the probability that defectors, 
when originating from a single individual in one of the two mod- 
ules, can invade the other module via the direct links between the 
two modules. As shown in appendix B, an expression for p m fol- 
lows directly from equation (6) by taking into account that in an 
m module network there are only L out / (m − 1) links between any 
module pair. The number of cooperator modules predicted to re- 
sist defector invasion can be obtained as the asymptotic value of 
C s when iterating equations (7) from initial condition C 0 = m − 1 , 
D 0 = 0 and U 0 = 1 . 
The solid lines in Fig. 6 show this quantity as a function of 
modularity, for different values of b ( m = 100 , n = 150 ). The com- 
partment model captures the transition observed in the individ- 
ual based model. For large b there is also a good quantitative 
agreement, as seen from the small deviations to simulation results 
(dots). 
In appendix A we show that for large m (or equivalently 
small p m ), our compartment model is equivalent to the Kermack- 
McKendrick model ( Kermack and McKendrick, 1927 ). This is a vari- 
ant of an SIR model that describes the spreading of an infectious 
disease in a homogeneous population. This equivalence allows us 
to adopt results derived for the SIR model to our system. In partic- 
ular, the epidemic threshold, which cleaves the parameter space in 
Fig. 7. Critical line (black) through the parameter space given by the network mod- 
ularity Q and the cheating advantage b separates the vulnerable from the resilient 
regime (for ﬁxed n = 150 and m = 100 ) as predicted by resilience condition (9) . 
The color indicates the fraction of modules resisting defector invasion obtained as 
an average from 200 to 10 0 0 simulations per Q − b combination ( T = 180 0 ). 
a region where a disease outbreak is limited to a fraction of people 
and a region where it is expected to pervade the entire population 
(epidemic). A disease is below the epidemic threshold if the num- 
ber of secondary infections caused by a single primary infection is 
less than one. As shown also in appendix A, the analogous of this 
threshold in our system can be written in terms of the following 
inequality: 
p m (m − 1) < 1 (8) 
If the inequality holds, the system is resilient to defector in- 
vasion. This is the case if the expected number of modules in- 
vaded directly from the module where the ﬁrst defector occurs is 
less than one. As explained in appendix B, for networks with large 
modules ( n 1) and a large number of modules ( m 1), resilience 
condition (8) can be rewritten in terms of modularity, module size, 
number of modules and cheating advantage as: 
Q > 1 − 1 
m 
− 1 n 
2 
(b − 1) , (9) 
thus, providing a threshold for the spreading of a defector that is 
explicitly related to the modularity of the network. Whenever the 
level of modularity of the social network is higher than the thresh- 
old in Eq. (9) , cooperation will be stable in the face of defectors. 
The dotted line in Fig. 7 indicates the combinations of Q − b val- 
ues for which the two sides of inequality (9) are equal. It desig- 
nates the boundary between the resilient (lower left) and the vul- 
nerable (upper right) regimes through the Q − b parameter space. 
The colors represent the fraction of modules resisting defector in- 
vasion computed from simulations. The predicted critical line quite 
well aligns with the threshold observed in simulations, indicating 
that inequality 9 seems suitable as a resilience condition. 
While it is convenient to express the resilience condition in 
terms of modularity, it blurs the fact that the number of modules 
does not affect resilience. In particular, both the constant one and 
the term 1/ m appear on both sides of inequality (9) and it can thus 
be rewritten as: 
α n 
1 
2 
(b − 1) < 1 (10) 
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Fig. 8. Fraction of cooperator modules resisting defector invasion in a network with m = 100 modules and n = 150 nodes per module and b = 1 . 5 . The critical line is indicated 
by the bold dashed line. The ﬁne lines originating in the bottom left corner are isoclines of constant α. The lines running from top to bottom are isoclines of constant average 
degree z . 
3.3. Non-homogeneous modules 
Our formula for the invasion probability r 2 (and p m ) was de- 
rived based on the assumption of fully connected modules. Fig. 8 
shows a comparison between simulations (left) and analytical pre- 
dictions (right) if this assumption is relaxed. 
In both plots the colors indicate the fraction of resistant mod- 
ules as a function of the fraction of interactions within ( L in ) and 
between ( L out ) modules. For the simulations the values were com- 
puted as an average over 200 simulations per data point ( T = 
1800 ). For the analytical results we used, as for Fig. 6 , the time 
asymptotic value of C s (divided by m ). The largest considered L in 
value designates the fully connected limit (right borders) and the 
smallest value is where only around 5 percent of the possible in- 
ternal links are realized. 
As noted, both the course of the critical line (bold black) as well 
as the shape of the transition predicted by the compartment model 
is in good agreement with the simulation results. In the supple- 
mentary material we provide additional plots for other parameter 
values which convey a similar picture. 
4. Discussion 
We showed that a modular network structure can prevent the 
spreading of defectors in a cooperative society. This protective ef- 
fect is, however, a rather all or nothing property that sets in only 
after modularity exceeds a critical threshold value. We found that 
the crucial quantity governing this abrupt transition between a 
vulnerable and a resilient regime is the probability with which 
defectors can invade adjacent cooperator modules before reaching 
a limiting local density. For a simpliﬁed two module system, we 
could derive a formula for this invasion probability. Moreover, it 
turned out that the two module case approximates well the in- 
vasion probability between pairs of modules in a multi-module 
system. This allowed us to use a compartment model, parameter- 
ized with the invasion probability, to predict the observed transi- 
tion. Since the compartment model is equivalent to a well studied 
SIR model, we could adopt the condition derived for the epidemic 
threshold to our system. This led to an expression for the condi- 
tion under which a cooperative society is resilient against defector 
invasion. This condition depends on modularity, module size, and 
the cheating advantage defectors have over cooperators. 
Beyond supporting previous ﬁndings that a modular network 
structure protects cooperation ( Fotouhi et al., 2018; Gianetto and 
Heydari, 2015; Lozano et al., 2008; Marcoux and Lusseau, 2013 ), 
our results also shed light on the type of relationship between 
modularity and resilience, as well as on the mechanisms that give 
rise to it. This understanding might help in choosing the appro- 
priate action when trying to increase the resilience of coopera- 
tive societies (e.g. reducing inter module connectivity). Of value is 
for example the insight that the effectiveness with which a cer- 
tain system modiﬁcation increases resilience crucially depends on 
the current conﬁguration of the system. This is best illustrated in 
Fig. 7 , where it is apparent that depending on where in the Q − b
parameter space a system resides, it might be more effective to ei- 
ther lower the cheating advantage or increase modularity to avoid 
the vulnerable regime. Hence, based on our resilience condition 
one could, in principle, calculate the most effective measures to 
increase the resilience of a particular cooperative society. 
The fact that our results were obtained for only a subset of con- 
ceivable structural and dynamical setups, puts however limits on 
the generality of our conclusions. Concerning structure, we only 
considered networks where all modules have the same size and 
internal connectivity and where the same number of edges con- 
nect each pair of modules. A convenience of this is that there 
is a unique invasion probability suitable for all pairs of modules. 
However, once heterogeneity is introduced among modules, by for 
instance varying the number of outgoing connections, we would 
have to deal with multiple invasion probabilities potentially two 
for each pair of modules. How the accuracy of predictions, based 
on an average invasion probability, would decline with the in- 
crease in heterogeneity is not clear. From studies on spreading 
processes it is however known that deviations from the homoge- 
neous limit can result in substantial differences in, for example, 
the actual values of the critical threshold ( Newman, 2002 ). Con- 
cerning the dynamical aspects, the generality of our results is lim- 
ited in that we considered only a particular type of strategy up- 
date scheme. There are however multiple alternative schemes com- 
monly used in studies on cooperation on networks (e.g. birth-death 
and death-birth update). Comparisons between different schemes 
revealed that the choice of the update scheme can affect whether 
cooperation is favored or not, on a particular network structure 
( Ohtsuki et al., 2006 ). Hence, while alternative update schemes 
would certainly change the results quantitatively, it might also be 
that certain schemes would produce qualitatively different results. 
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However, the convergence of results between our study and stud- 
ies that used different setups ( Fotouhi et al., 2018; Jiang and Perc, 
2013 ) makes us conﬁdent that our results are not just a peculiarity 
of the model chosen here. 
Another insight worth mentioning is concerned with the suit- 
ability of the modularity measure Q as a predictor for the response 
of a modular network to defector invasion. Inequality (10) states 
that there are two basic topological features determining resilience. 
First, the proportion of internal to external connections a mod- 
ule has ( L in / L out ), which determines the probability α with which 
an individual engages in an interaction with a node from another 
module. Second, the number of nodes per module n . From these 
two features, the measure Q only accounts for the interaction prob- 
ability, but not for module size. Consequently, adding nodes to 
modules, while maintaining the proportion of internal to exter- 
nal connections, lowers resilience, but does not affect modular- 
ity. In addition, Q includes the number of modules m in its def- 
inition, which does not affect resilience (for m 1). As a conse- 
quence, one can not increase resilience by increasing modularity 
through the inclusion of additional modules. Based on these ob- 
servations, we conclude that the modularity measure Q , as deﬁned 
in Newman and Girvan (2004) , is not an ideal predictor for the 
response of a modular network to defector invasion. The more in- 
formative quantity turns out to be the product of interaction prob- 
ability and number of nodes per module. Interpreted from a dy- 
namical point of view, this quantity is the rate at which external 
interactions occur, i.e., the expected number of interactions all in- 
dividuals of a module have with individuals from other modules 
per unit time. 
In summary, our study is in line with the hypothesis that a 
modular organization increases the resilience of networked sys- 
tems (see however Sah et al. (2017) ). It however exempliﬁes that 
the relationships between modularity and resilience can be non- 
linear. A pattern also revealed by recent theoretical studies investi- 
gating the effect of network modularity on the ﬁxation probability 
of cooperators within a defective society ( Fotouhi et al., 2018; Jiang 
and Perc, 2013 ). Further work needs to clarify the implications of 
this non-linearity in for example the ability to anticipate shifts in 
the resilience of evolving systems. 
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Appendix A 
A1. A: Equivalence of the compartment model and 
Kermack-McKendrick model 
Here we show that the compartment model deﬁned by the 
difference equation system (7) is, for small p m , equivalent to the 
Kermack-McKendrick model ( Kermack and McKendrick, 1927 ). This 
basic variant of an SIR model is deﬁned by the following system of 
coupled differential equations: 
dS 
dt 
= −βSI 
dI 
dt 
= βSI − γ I (A.1) 
dR 
dt 
= γ I. 
The previous system models the spreading of an infectious dis- 
ease in a homogeneous population, with S being the number of 
susceptible people, I being the number of infected people and R 
being the number of people who recovered from the disease and 
developed immunity. The two parameters are the infection rate β
and the recovery rate γ . 
The equivalence to our compartment model is best seen by con- 
sidering the continuous limit of the difference equation system (7) . 
Note, in contrast to the main text, here we use t instead of s to re- 
fer to time in the compartment model. In the continuous limit, the 
temporal change in the number of cooperator modules C is given 
by (in the last step we applied L’Hospital’s rule): 
dC 
dt 
= lim 
t→ 0 
C t+t −C t 
t 
= lim 
t→ 0 
−C t (1 − (1 − p m ) U t t ) 
t 
= C t U t log (1 − p m ) 
The continuous time equation for the change in the number of 
transient modules U follows directly from the previous equation 
as: 
dU 
dt 
= −C t U t log (1 − p m ) −U t 
Further, the continuous time equation for the frequency of de- 
fector modules ( D ) is: 
dD 
dt 
= U t 
Since for p m 1 log (1 − p m ) ≈ − p m , we can write the change 
of the number of cooperator modules as: 
dC 
dt 
≈ −p m CU 
dU 
dt 
≈ p m CU −U (A.2) 
dD 
dt 
= U 
From Eq. (A.2) , the equivalence to Eq. (A.1) is apparent by the 
correspondence S → C, I → U, R → D between state variables and the 
correspondence β → p m , γ → 1 between parameters. 
The crucial quantity for the epidemic threshold in the Kermack- 
McKendirck model is the basic reproductive number R 0 Weisstein . 
It is deﬁned as the number of secondary infections caused by a 
single infected individual introduced into a population of other- 
wise susceptible individuals (note that the original naming is a bit 
misleading since R 0 has nothing to do with R the number of recov- 
ered individuals). Formally, the reproductive number can be writ- 
ten as: 
R 0 = βS 
γ
If R 0 > 1 a disease is expected to spread because an individ- 
ual who carries it infects more than one susceptible. In contrast, 
if R 0 < 1 a disease outbreak is expected to wane. Given the equiv- 
alence of this SIR model to our compartment model, the basic re- 
production number translates to the expected number of cooper- 
ator modules invaded (directly) from a single transient module. 
This quantity can be written as p m C , with p m being the invasion 
probability in an m module network. Stated as a condition that, if 
fulﬁlled, implies resilience to defector invasion, and also assuming 
that initially C 0 = m − 1 we have: 
p m (m − 1) < 1 
Apparently, at the critical threshold, p m is small if the num- 
ber of modules m is large. Hence, we expect results derived for 
the Kermack-McKendrick model to also hold for our system if the 
number of modules is suﬃciently large. 
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A2. B: Derivation of the resilience condition 
Based on the equivalence of our compartment model (equations 
(7) ) to the Kermack-McKendirck SIR model, we could derive in- 
equality (8) as a condition that, if satisﬁed, implies the resilience 
of a cooperative society to defector invasion (see appendix A). In 
what follows, we restate this condition in terms of the basic model 
parameters Q, b, n , and m . We do so by using an approximation of 
p m that holds if both m and n are large. 
A formula for p m follows directly from that for r 2 , by incorpo- 
rating the fact that in an m module network the probability of 
an individual to interact with an individual from another mod- 
ule is given by α/ (m − 1) (with α = L out / (2 L in + L out ) as deﬁned in 
Section 3.1 ). Hence, considering a cooperator module and a module 
occupied by a fraction d of defectors, the probability of a cooper- 
ator on the cooperator module to be replaced by a defector from 
the other module during a single strategy update is given by: 
r m (d) = d α
(m − 1) 
[ 
1 − d − 1 
b 
] 
(B.1) 
This formula corresponds to r 2 ( d ) scaled by 1 / (m − 1) and writ- 
ten in terms of α instead of modularity, which is more conve- 
nient for the following computations. By replacing r 2 ( d ) by r m ( d ) 
in equation (6) we can write p m as: 
p m = 1 − e 
∫ 1 − 1 
b 
1 
n 
n 
δ(d) 
log [1 −r m (d )] d d 
(B.2) 
Instead of solving Eq. (B.2) directly, we approximate p m through 
its linearization at α = 0 : 
p m ≈ α dp m 
dα
∣∣∣
α=0 
= α n 
(m − 1) 
(
1 − 1 
b 
)
[ 
log 
(
b − b 
n 
)
+ 1 
b − b 
n 
− 1 
] 
We show the computation of the derivative as well as the va- 
lidity of the approximation for systems with m 1 in the supple- 
mentary material. If we further assume that the number of nodes 
per module n is also large, then the above expression simpliﬁes 
to: 
p m ≈ α
(m − 1) n 
[ 
log (b) 
(1 − 1 
b 
) 
− 1 
] 
Plugging this approximation of p m into the resilience condition 
(8) gives: 
α n 
[ 
log (b) 
(1 − 1 
b 
) 
− 1 
] 
< 1 (B.3) 
The term (m − 1) canceled out, indicating that the number of 
modules does not affect the critical threshold. This is because near 
the threshold the expected number of modules invaded from a 
transient module is approximately equal to the expected number 
of nodes invaded from that module (which is what the left side 
of the inequality reﬂects). This holds because we assume m >> 1, 
which implies that around the threshold the expected number of 
modules being invaded is small compared to the actual number of 
modules. 
We can rewrite inequality (B.3) in terms of modularity using 
equation (2) , which reintroduces m into the condition (but with 
no effect since it appears on both sides of the inequality). 
Q > 1 − 1 
m 
− 1 
n 
[ 
log (b) 
(1 − 1 
b 
) 
− 1 
] . (B.4) 
Since for b ∈ [1, 2] the term log (b) / (1 − 1 
b 
) is well approximated 
by 1 2 (b + 1) , the two versions of the resilience condition can be 
expressed in an even simpler form as: 
α n 
1 
2 
(b − 1) < 1 (B.5) 
Q > 1 − 1 
m 
− 1 n 
2 
(b − 1) (B.6) 
Supplementary material 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be 
found, in the online version, at doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.10.018 
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